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Abstract:  We provide a framework for the design of sustainable business models. While extant 
literature on business models focuses on unlocking positive externalities, we propose a business 
model framework that effectively addresses negative externalities. A taxonomy - based on trans-
organizational models and governance modes - classifies instruments that counsel behaviour 
patterns. Sustainability strategies that deal with externalities often merge instruments to manage 
multi-stakeholder responsibilities and exchanges. The framework draws upon three established 
research themes - network organizational models, governance modes, and instrumental 
stakeholder theory - to distinguish between six instrument classes. To illustrate its potential for 
analysis the paper compiles instruments within these classes, contrasts selected instruments, and 
applies the framework to diverse sustainability examples. We find preliminary evidence for 
superior performance of plural instruments for sustainability strategies, and identify key areas of 
research for advancing sustainable business models.  
 
Keywords: Sustainability instruments; network organizations; instrumental stakeholder theory; 
governance modes; externality.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Concerns about the sustainability of business arise when the mutual value exchanged 
by transacting parties bears potential costs for communities, such as degrading economic 
resources, undermining social values or causing harm to the environment. Economic theory 
has revealed collaboration of multiple stakeholders as an effective response to the “tragedy of 
the commons” (Garrett 1968; Ostrom 1990). The bundling of property rights to common pool 
resources and public goods, and the allocation of these rights and associated responsibilities 
among multiple stakeholders is a key function of regulators charged with sustainability (for 
instance, Panayotou 1995; Yandle 2006). Sustainable development strategies guide 
stakeholders to use these rights and responsibilities to control resources in line with interests 
of the community. Public agencies and policy makers recognize that all stakeholders - 
including socially responsible corporations, non-commercial private groups, and public 
agencies - should participate in this process (for instance, Vandenbergh & Cohen 2010; 
Epstein 2008).  
The purpose of this paper is to show how network organizations and governance 
modes contribute to sustainable business models. Both have positive effects on the 
corporation’s sustainability and financial performance. In strategic management, the emerging 
literature of business models has shown evidence that a business can unlock positive 
externalities by interacting with stakeholders such as partners, suppliers, or non-governmental 
organizations (Chesbrough et al. 2006; Henkel & Maurer, 2010). Therefore, contrary to 
intuition, research has demonstrated that investing in public goods - improving corporate 
social performance and sustainability performance - can show positive effects on financial 
performance (see Orlitzky et al 2003; Luo & Bhattacharya 2009; Epstein 2008). Yet 
orchestrating social and private benefits remains a challenge (Margolis & Walsh 2003), and 
the role specific instruments play in this orchestration remains under-researched. In this paper 
we contribute to this complementary view, on how business models can provide an effective 
response to potential negative externalities with instruments that link organizational models 
with governance modes. 
This paper draws from three streams of research to propose a framework for 
sustainability strategies: network organizational models that differentiate between the network 
and the dyad-character of relationships; governance modes for inter-organizational exchange, 
namely contracts, markets, or relationships; and instrumental behavior that relates exchange 
and other behaviors to specific economic and non-economic organizational objectives, based 
on stakeholder theory. The paper’s main contribution is a framework for instruments based on 
interactions among the two- way and three-way classifications of business models and 
governance modes. Most instruments for governance modes are designed for dyadic 
exchanges rather than true network exchanges. The paper elaborates on complementarity 
between incentive contracts and syndication, representative of two important cells in the 
framework for sustainability governance. It applies this framework to diverse examples that 
demonstrate network instruments have different effects than dyadic instruments on 
sustainability value creation. Plural governance is a mix of instruments from all classes in the 
framework, which the paper illustrates with examples of success and failure in sustainability. 
The examples indicate that failures in sustainability occur in part when projects lack plurality 
in instruments, while success draws upon all instrument classes. The main conclusion is that 
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multi-stakeholder organizational models for sustainability require property rights to be 
managed with plural governance instruments.   
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the perspective of 
sustainability concerns as stakeholder externalities that require a system of property rights and 
responsibilities. The following three sections draw upon the three research streams to argue 
that open business models support two distinct classes of exchanges, either network or dyadic; 
that each of three governance modes, contracts, markets or relationships, have limitations; and 
that responses are instrumental behaviours for economic and non-economic ends. The 
subsequent section presents the two-by-three framework for instrumental responses, and the 
following section contrasts syndication and incentive contracts as two representative 
instruments. The penultimate section discusses examples as applications of the framework 
and a final section concludes with suggested future research directions. 
   
NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES & PROPERTY RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 
Consequences of development impose an unwanted and unintended social cost that 
most traditional business models fail to recognize. A true cost to society that does not show up 
in a firm’s profit and loss statement is termed an external cost - or externality. One major 
class of external costs is environmental degradation: mismanagement of common pool 
resources; under-investment in public goods; and depletion of non-renewable resource 
(Ostrom 1990). These have economic and social consequences, and result in long run damage 
to livelihoods, incomes and community systems. The producer and the recipient of the 
externality may be different stakeholders, as in an upstream paper mill and a downstream 
water supply system, or the same stakeholder as in global greenhouse gas emissions (Field & 
Field 2009: p. 74). Externalities are difficult to deal with since they are driven by individual 
motivations, such as self-interest when the recipients are different stakeholders and free-riding 
when recipients include the same stakeholder, but such motivations are the source of 
collective disasters. Almost three decades ago sustainable development was defined by a UN 
Commission that grappled with these externalities on a global scale. The Brundtland 
Commission, formally the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 
was convened by the United Nations in 1983. This often cited definition is: “Sustainable 
development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” 
Why must commercial organizations find ways to engage with negative environmental 
externalities in their business models? What if sustainability externalities continued to be 
ignored? The Stern Review Report on The Economics of Climate Change (2007) estimates 
the direct and indirect costs to consumption, environmental services and health to be 11-14 % 
of GDP. The costs of stabilization would be about 1% of GDP by 2050, according to the Stern 
Review, although it is a considerably higher percentage at this time. The obvious conclusion 
is that a small cost to the GDP could prevent ten times as much in lost value. Not many 
investments in the “business-as-usual” approach can boast of such returns (May 2008). Some 
portion of these negative externalities for a given business results in lost value for other 
businesses. Debates in the literature on whether there is tension between a firm’s 
responsibility toward its own shareholders for economic profit and to other shareholders of 
other businesses, or other stakeholders in general for social welfare must, therefore, account 
for negative externalities and the returns from such activity.  
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Many reports identify two kinds of risk from climate change due to GHG emissions. 
One type of risk is from natural calamities or deterioration of the resource base. Swiss Re, an 
insurance firm, estimates that weather damage, pollution, industrial and agricultural losses 
and other expenses could amount to $300 billion annually. Leading companies now report 
environmental risks in annual statements. A different type of risk arises from mandatory 
compliance pressures. Regulations, fines, taxes, and caps on GHG emissions will impose 
financial burdens unless prior plans on emission reduction are put into place. The electricity 
utility industry alone is estimated at exposures of $60 billion annually. To ignore this risk is 
fiscal irresponsibility by the firm’s governing board. Self-regulation and self-imposed 
compliance measures are necessary but insufficient, as competitive pressures demand industry 
wide compliance. Leading corporations universally acknowledge the non-sustainability of 
business-as-usual since the Stern Review Report (2007). The UN sponsored Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment of 2005 found that approximately 60 percent of ecosystems services 
that supported life on earth were being used unsustainably. A measure of economic value of 
such services at the time was GBP 30 trillion in 1996. Vandenbergh & Cohen (2010) observe 
that financial stakeholders are individuals and citizens, and include public pension and 
socially responsible investments funds. 
The literature is beginning to recognize the link between corporate social 
responsibility and externalities. While an early and influential review of corporate social 
performance and corporate financial performance finds no mention of negative externalities 
(Margolis & Walsh 2003), more recent research does. For instance, O’Higgins (2010) 
proposes a framework of normative and instrumental stakeholder concerns that reveals 
inadequate corporate responses to externalities.  
Business models employ instruments that package a system of incentives to guide 
exchange behaviour patterns. Panayotou (1995) defines an economic instrument as any 
instrument that “aims to induce a change in behaviour of economic agents by internalizing 
environmental or depletion cost through a change in the incentive structure that these agents 
face (p.7 )”. The author observes that different instruments have advantages or severe 
limitations depending on the application, and much of the experience with instruments comes 
from their uses as sources of government revenues, much less as incentives to alter behaviour 
in sustainable development. Systems may not exist for stakeholders to accept and to alter their 
behaviours. Young (2004) makes an argument for shared responsibility and collective action, 
but notes that institutions need to be reformed through mediated actions of all stakeholders to 
better regulate harmful outcomes. 
One instrument to address the institutional reform process is to create a system of 
property rights that bundle responsibilities along with rights. Ehret & Wirtz (2010) review 
property rights theory from the viewpoint of private asset ownership strategy, and conclude 
that crucial advantages can accrue to firms from acquisition of rights and responsible 
management of these rights. By extension, crucial common pool resources can be allocated 
with property rights and responsibilities to stakeholders. Rajagopal & Zilberman (2007) 
acknowledge enforcement of property rights and trading mechanisms as a successful policy 
tool in addition to price-based incentives and direct controls. Panayotou (1995) discusses 
property rights as a major economic instrument. Yandle (2006) provides further references 
and reviews the property rights policy approach, and evaluates its success in a marine 
sustainability management context. Hoffman (2006) studies the impact where Germany 
introduced a carbon tax as well as an emissions trading scheme, a property rights approach, 
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while New Zealand has not made serious attempts to employ these instruments so far. As it 
appears, both approaches lead to different outcomes, with Germany on a good way to 
achieving its reduction target, while New Zealand's carbon emissions are still rising. Plurality 
of instruments is a relevant concern. 
 
OPEN BUSINESS MODELS: NETWORKS OR DYADS 
A primary dimension of our framework is that of organizational models. Strategic 
success is contingent on the appropriate design of organizational models. For instance, Zott & 
Amit (2008) argue that optimal strategy for a firm is linked to its administrative structures. 
Organizational networks consist of complex alliances, supply chains, markets, franchises or 
syndicates with large numbers of parties entering into multi-lateral exchanges and have been 
discussed in the literature for more than two decades (Hakansson & Johanson 1988; Larson 
1992; Dyer & Singh 1998; Gulati et al 2000; Graebner & Eisenhardt 2004). Achrol & Kotler 
(1999) distinguish type of networks and propose research to determine how marketing 
strategies are contingent upon network model types such as internal, vertical, market, and 
opportunity networks, and structures such as weak and strong ties, and flexibility. Other 
authors document the evolution, range and scope of network business models (Chesbrough 
and Appleyard 2007; Ehret and Wirtz 2010; Day 2011). A crucial distinction for the purpose 
of the present paper is that the decisions in networks are made by teams consisting of multiple 
organizations whereas in dyads they are made by a pair of organizations. 
 
DYADS OR STAKEHOLDER PAIRS 
The parties are typically two businesses, or a business and a regulatory authority, or a 
corporation and an NGO. Two parties may develop bilateral contractual agreements in order 
to govern their exchange in a manner that does not require recourse to courts or arbitrators. 
The contracts usually are self-enforcing and specify what penalties will occur if terms are 
breached. Bilateral contracts recognize that complexities of modern business render third 
parties incapable of understanding the relevant details and the best parties to govern 
exchanges are the concerned parties themselves.  Contracts that are not self-enforcing need a 
third party to enforce the contract, and perhaps adjudicate and penalize breach of contract. 
The third party is usually the presiding court, relevant government body such as a Pollution 
Control Board, or industry association.  
 
STAKEHOLDER NETWORKS 
Here, many parties are simultaneously involved in decision making. Some decision 
makers who are involved are customers, NGOs, research universities, policy makers, 
community representatives, investors, employees, and managers. Achrol & Kotler (1999) 
provide an operational definition of the network organization, stressing several common 
aspects to the present paper’s concept of stakeholder networks such as non-hierarchy, 
specializations, shared value systems, and shared responsibilities. Berghman et al (2006) 
argues that companies should build three types of competencies: marketing practices for 
external knowledge absorption, general organizational competences and supply chain/network 
competences. Of these, the third competency contrasts dyadic and network approaches.  
Larson (1992) discusses network dyads as a non-hybrid alternative to markets and 
hierarchies (see also Powell 1990). The present paper’s governance modes include contracts 
and relationships in addition to markets as non-hierarchies based on exchange between 
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organizations. Moreover, the trans-organizational network in the present paper is distinct from 
the sets of dyads concept, and are more like ‘poly-ads’ of multiple stakeholders in joint 
exchange. Achrol & Kotler (1999) also distinguish between networks of single-source 
partners and multiple partners, which our distinction between dyads and networks echoes. 
 
GOVERNANCE MODES AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
A complementary dimension of our framework is that of governance modes. Keast et al 
(2006) propose the working definition that governance modes are alternative ways of 
organizing society, each “... underpinned by a set of ideological assumptions and principles 
that guide its operation and optimal operating conditions.” The authors defend hybrid 
governance modes – mixing heirarchical, market and network modes - for complex policy 
regimes aimed at environmental protection. Self-governance enhances democratization and 
participation in contexts of environmental externalities (Stavins 1995). Over four decades of 
research in organizational and marketing theories has addressed self-governance of inter-
organizational exchanges. Contracts, markets and relationships are three basic constituent 
modes of self-governance that underlie more complex governance mechanisms. This section 
highlights reasons why plural self-governance modes are needed to compensate for the 
failures of each (as also argued by Cannon et al 2000; Seshadri & Mishra 2004). 
  
PLURAL GOVERNANCE 
Contracts, Markets, and Collaborative Relationships are complementary mechanisms 
(for instance, see Cannon et al 2000). Sustainability efforts are governed by, for example, 
tradable discharge permits in cap-and-trade exchanges (markets); vendor-purchaser 
agreements that specify emission targets to reduce carbon footprints (contracts); and 
associations between firms in many sectors for standards setting (collaborative relationships). 
Markets provide a baseline for contracts, and parties can enter contracts to improve upon what 
they can clearly achieve on spot markets. Better contractual agreements, where they can be 
drafted, support deeper and more complex relations (for instance, see Seshadri & Mishra, 
2004). Contracts provide a lowest common ground for building relationships, and shore up 
trust and commitments.  
Markets: The elegant Theory of Markets establishes the optimality of open market trades that 
deliver what people want and satisfy needs by employing an enforceable price system. Yet 
market failures are widely noted and have many sources. It was recognized early that the 
Arrow-Debreu model of efficient markets is incomplete in accounting for institutional 
economic behaviour and the scope of organizations (Arrow 1974). Significant market failures 
are due to society’s inability to fully account for costs or enforce collection of due revenues. 
There is wide agreement that the market mechanism cannot deliver the curtailment of 
consumption required for sustainability without additional incentives (Salzman 1997; Sachs 
2008).  
Contracts: Contracts between a principal and one or many external agents can be designed as 
mechanisms that help resolve divergent interests of the parties (see Jensen & Meckling 1976 
for the agency theory of contracting). Contracts allocate and shift the balance of risks and 
obligations in the supply chain. Information asymmetries between organizations, such as 
those encountered in sustainability life cycle assessments, introduce agency problems in the 
design of contracts (Connelly et al 2011). These problems often need recourse to third parties 
such as courts to adjudicate disputes, and rely on theories of justice. Legal theory has recently 
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re-interpreted how covenants in contracts on sustainability gain acceptance. Castro (2012) 
identifies mediating systems that are needed to communicate and legitimize new laws through 
an extended psychosocial process. This process is necessary also because of contractual 
incompleteness. Some sources of contractual incompleteness are failures to anticipate 
contingencies and situations; devise joint courses of action; write explicit clauses for 
contingencies; and monitor and enforce agreements (Hart 1988). Transaction Cost Economics 
takes a descriptive approach to incomplete contracts and focuses attention on costs of 
contracting (Williamson 1996). The quest to reduce these costs provides the rationale for 
extra-contractual approaches. For instance, Kashyap et al (2012) investigate incentives 
beyond ex ante contractual agreements derived from agency theory in franchise distribution 
systems.  
Collaborative Relationships: Several authors have studied relationships and value creation 
over the last three decades (for example, Berry 1983; Dwyer, Schurr & Oh 1987; Morgan & 
Hunt 1994; Sheth & Parvatiyar 1995; Gundlach, Achrol & Mentzer 1995; Grönroos1997; Day 
2000). Among the several benefits of inter-organizational relationships are long term 
collaborative partnerships. The more general construct of collaboration has been defined in 
early work as the degree to which partners are able to work together in a joint fashion toward 
their respective goals (Frazier 1983), which can be facilitated by relationships. Jap (2001) 
argues that unique joint competencies emerge from heterogeneity of capabilities from 
collaborations. Many authors closely link collaboration performance with financial 
performance (for instance, Spekman & Carraway 2006; Paulraj et al 2008; Nyaga et al 2010; 
Claro & Claro 2004). Meta-analysis reveals a sales growth advantage with innovation and 
inter-organizational collaboration (Bahadir et al 2009). Crittendon et al (2011) note that many 
companies treat sustainability as a single level rather than an end-to-end supply chain issue. 
They argue for a proposition (P4a: p. 77) that “a sustainability strategy will be associated with 
a collaboration culture among supply chain members.” Collaboration relationships can and 
must include non-commercial stakeholders. Epstein (2008) discusses collaboration between 
firms and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for sustainability. Despite the benefits of 
collaboration, partners cannot assure continuity in relationships. Low expectation of future 
exchange is one reason (Crosby et al 1990). Wilson (1995) observes that even well-
established and mature relationships may terminate for a variety of reasons.  
 
INSTRUMENTAL STAKEHOLDER THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAVIORS 
Stakeholder theory has held been a mainstream subject for organizational research (for 
instance, Freeman 1984; Donaldson & Preston 1995; Clarkson 1995; Mitchell et al 1997; Jones 
& Wicks 1999; Margolis & Walsh 2003; Bhattacharya et al 2009; Smith et al 2009; 
Vandenbergh & Cohen 2010; Sheth et al 2011). Instrumental Stakeholder Theory argues against 
a reductionist approach, such as narrow self-interest, to explain behaviour and posits that 
outcomes are contingent on a wide range of possible behaviours that balance economic and non-
economic ends (Jones & Wicks 1999; Brickson 2007; O’Higgins 2010).  
Stakeholder theories have been linked in the literature to organizational exchange models 
and governance modes. Margolis & Walsh (2003) in their extensive review of corporate social 
performance (CSP) and stakeholder theory raise the question of whether there is a tension of ‘to 
profit or to serve’ in organizational purpose. Put differently, can companies be agents of social 
repair while being agents of economic efficiency? The authors point to several reviews that 
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acknowledge the close positive connections between CSP and corporate financial performance 
(CFP), while leaving important questions unanswered making it a vexed problem in the literature. 
They propose a descriptive research agenda to investigate how firms internally control, monitor 
and discipline their social actions. In the last decade sustainability problems have gained in 
significance in CSP approaches, and could serve to drive a wedge between CSP and CFP. Our 
concern in the present paper on governance modes for stakeholder networks aimed at 
sustainability echoes this call for research, while incorporating the role of externalities. Brickson 
(2007) proposed an organizational identity orientation framework that distinguishes between 
stakeholder organizations connecting dyadically (labelled Relational in their paper) and 
organizations connecting to a larger group of members (Collectivistic). He notes that 
organizational identity orientations aid in instrumental stakeholder theories since it explains how 
organizations engage in certain sets of behaviours. The author’s two categories – Relational and 
Collectivist -  correspond to what we call dyads and networks respectively  in the present paper’s 
framework.  
Instruments are formal connections between stakeholders organizations intended to 
generate desired responses as behaviours. O’Higgins (2010) distinguishes instrumental 
stakeholders as those that have a role in determining organizational behaviour upon which the 
desired outcome is contingent (see also Post et al 2002). This paper classifies instruments by 
the intersection of organizational models and governance modes. For instance, instruments of 
dyadic contractual modes will differ from those of network collaborative relationship modes. 
This means that specific sets of behavioural responses of specific stakeholders will also differ 
among the two, and instrumental stakeholder theory suggests that the outcomes contingent on 
the behaviours will also differ. The next section describes the framework, instruments and 
their classification. 
 
INSTRUMENTAL TRANS-ORGANIZATIONAL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
The framework classifies instruments of governance by a two-way dimension of trans-
organizational models and a three-way dimension of governance modes. The six cells allow us to 
distinguish instrumental behaviors in trans-organizational governance. The six classes of 
instruments are: 
(A) Network-Contract: Contractual agreements in value chains between multiple stakeholders 
can be based on performance measures that address externalities.  
(B) Network-Market:  A market allows buying and selling of tradable discharge permits and 
emission credits. Price discovery follows from this process.   
(C) Network-Relationship: Performance management requires recognition of all instrumental 
stakeholders and the necessity of securing their collaboration for shared responsibilities in 
sustainability.   
 (D) Dyad-Contract: Single–agent contracts use instruments such as royalties, fees, shares of 
cost-over- and –under runs, and the like to share risks and provide incentives for sustainability 
efforts subject to moral hazard.  
(E) Dyad-Market: As markets involve large numbers of buyers and seller, a dyad here has 
special meaning. It implies a broker intermediates, or a market index is used to adjust forward 
pricing in contractual agreements on derivatives associated with permits. It could also refer to 
reverse auctions for selection of dyadic partners from a pool of qualified bidders. 
(F) Dyad-Relationship: Relational instruments subjugate short term self-interest to long 
term or enlightened self-interest (Feinman 2000; Macneil 2000). Learning, commitment, and 
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reputation are processes that separate the two forms of self-interest behaviours. Bilateral 
relational instruments can help reduce large transaction costs in high contingency situations 
(Nordberg et al 1996). Table 1 is a summary of the framework. A further summary of 
representative instruments that qualify for these classes is in Appendix 1.  
 
TABLE 1: A FRAMEWORK FOR INSTRUMENTS OF PLURAL GOVERNANCE 
 
 
 
Governance Modes 
Contracts Market 
Collaborative 
Relationships 
Organizational 
Model 
Network 
Syndicates 
Franchising Systems 
 
 
Brand Clubs 
Exchanges/Mark
ets for Permits, 
Credits 
Labels/Footprints 
 
 
Board Reviews 
Standards, 
Certification  
Dyads 
 
Property Rights 
Liability Laws 
Taxes, subsidies, fees, 
licenses 
Incentive Contracts 
Yardstick Contracts 
Quotas, Allowances 
 
 
 
 
Brokerage 
Reverse Auctions 
 
 
 
Equity 
Investments 
Cooperative 
Bargaining & 
Negotiation 
 
  
SYNDICATION AND INCENTIVE CONTRACTS 
Instruments of governance that belong in different cells may be contrasted by examining 
how they deal with rights and responsibilities, contribute to joint production and revenue, 
apportion risk, and share the benefits of exchange. Syndication is a trans-organization 
business model that enables instruments in the network contract mode. Syndicates encourage 
participation of multiple stakeholders in joint production, and assign complementary claims 
and responsibilities. For instance renewable energy companies join together in a syndicate to 
build high voltage direct current transmission lines for power distribution. Members have 
territorial rights for transmission and responsibility for interconnections. Revenues are jointly 
obtained in the competitive power supply market over the grid. Uncertain costs are borne 
individually but uncertain revenues are common in the syndicate, and therefore profit risks are 
lower than for non-members. Members agree to sharing rules and joint revenues are 
distributed in accordance when the period of the contract expires.  
The incentive contract is primarily an instrument for the dyadic contract mode. The 
incentive contract is between a principal who designs and offers the contract, and an agent 
who has responsibility to expend effort and use resources, subject to supplier moral hazard 
that arises from shirking of costly effort of uncertain value. Rights to finished product or 
consumption of service are transferred from agent to principal for compensation determined 
by the contractual incentives. An example of the incentive contract is procurement by branded 
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knitwear of eco-friendly clothing that specifies a discharge target and a cost target. This 
instrument shares the financial burden of risk between the brand and supplier in order to 
control moral hazard in water use for textile dyeing.  The supplier meets the discharge target 
but the audited cost at the end of the procurement contract may either over-run or under-run 
the cost target. The brand links the compensation to the amount of under- or over-run by an 
incentive formula. 
Syndication and incentive contracts differ in several ways. (i) Property rights are pooled 
among members of a syndicate. In contrast, property rights are transferred for compensation 
in incentive contracts. (ii) Responsibility for joint production and revenues is shared in the 
syndicate. Responsibility for compensation is the principal’s and for production is the agent’s 
in the incentive contract. (iii) Syndication shares risk between members in order to reduce the 
financial burden of uncertainties, and zero risk would be ideal. Incentive contracts trades of 
risk versus incentives for suppliers, and zero risk would mean no incentive and no means to 
control moral hazard. (iv) Syndication reduces barriers to entry into larger projects as 
members pool their resources. Agents in incentive contracts have initial endowments that may 
restrict their ability to benefit from economies of scale. (v) In quality differentiated markets, 
syndicates  have the ability to provide incentives for efficient quality choices among members. 
Incentive contracts are restricted to meeting quality standards set by the principal. (vi) As 
there are networks of members in syndicates, there are ample opportunities for improved flow 
of ideas and opportunities. Incentive contracts rely on a single agent for innovations and flow 
of opportunity. In sum, network contracts deliver superior outcomes than dyadic contracts 
although they may be more difficult to administer.   
 
APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
The goal in the remainder of this paper is to make a case for stakeholders to mix 
instruments of all types - from all possible cells of the framework – for a comprehensive 
approach to sustainability strategy. It proposes that the deliberate mix will lead to superior 
results. Previous research in policy analysis argues that using hybrid governance modes lead 
to superior policies (Keast et al 2006). Research on product markets supports the conclusion 
that a mix of instruments from differing governance modes is likely to provide greater 
flexibility in safeguarding inter-firm exchanges (Cannon et al 2000). However, a similar 
conclusion for the other dimension of the framework is not available in the literature. There is 
little research on whether stakeholders prefer dyadic models over network models of 
organization for sustainability strategies, or whether a mix is more effective. Three diverse 
examples with mixed experience in governance help illustrate the framework, and make a 
case for a comprehensive mix – across network and dyadic exchanges, as well as across all 
governance modes.  
MARINE PRODUCT CO-MANAGEMENT IN NEW ZEALAND 
Marine products have had a long history of failed approaches to management of a 
public good. Tietenberg (2003) discusses policy approaches involving tradable permits which 
have emerged as a last resort when other approaches have failed, and presents evidence of 
improvement. Permits involve the assignment of property rights. A legal framework now 
exists in most regions for this, such as the US Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act. Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are ways to bundle property rights 
and allocate them among fishing organizations in such regulated regimes. The stakeholders, 
including industry groups, fishing communities, and environmental non-governmental 
organisations, seek involvement in this process. Péreau et al (2012) address conflicts and 
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tradeoffs that arise between conservation, the drive for economic efficiency and social 
objectives in ITQ managed fishery. Stakeholders then use plural instruments including 
syndication to govern exchange. Yandle (2006) describes co-management of common pool 
marine resources. Her study concludes that for fishery co-management to work efficiently 
characteristics of the property rights bundle (including rights of access, management, 
extraction, transfer, and exclusion and their associated responsibilities) must be carefully 
matched to the regime’s biological, social, and regulatory setting. There is a long evolutionary 
process for this to happen. Her study of New Zealand’s experience in co-management of Rock 
Lobster fisheries tracked evolving roles over decades from loose stakeholder groups as 
providers of management advice to that of a multi-sector user/stakeholder group forum 
involving syndicates engaged in policy-making. While the study supports overall success it 
identifies some remaining governance failures.  
Our framework explains two core failures identified in the study: (i) Rock Lobster co-
management omits to balance contractual incompleteness with network relationship 
instruments. This is one reason why gaps in stakeholder responsibilities remain on aspects of 
fishery management not directly related to quotas of catch output, such as port management. 
(ii) Stakeholders spontaneously change from network to dyadic instruments. In this case 
owners of property rights unbundled some responsibilities and rights, and disassociated rights 
to extraction and management for easier sale of their ITQs to large commercial organizations. 
This unbundling failed to assign the entire set of responsibilities that come with the original 
bundle of property rights.  
MINING FOR IRON-ORE IN INDIA 
The global market for high quality iron ore is growing rapidly, and the Bellary region 
in southern India is a major exporter to world markets. A non-governmental organization, 
Samaja Parivartana Samudaya (SPS), monitoring environmental impact recently moved the 
Supreme Court of India, which then ordered the Indian Council of Forestry Research and 
Education (ICFRE), an autonomous body under the Ministry of Environment and Forests to 
carry out a macro-level environmental impact assessment (EIA). While the ICFRE findings 
emphasized that mining was “unscientific” and reported widespread impact, it was criticised 
by SPS as deficient on two counts. First, even scientific mining may well be unsustainable or 
unacceptable to other stakeholders; and second, the economic impact on stakeholders had not 
been quantified. To correct these shortcomings an accelerated EIA was conducted by Cerana 
Foundation (CF) on behalf of SPS (Cerana Foundation EIA Report 2012).  
The findings of the CF report are summarized in a balance sheet that calculates annual 
profits at INR 3,500 crores ($660 million) from sale of about 14 million tonnes of ore, while 
agriculture / primary production annual income losses to other stakeholders in the region, and 
sequestration of carbon losses amount to INR 470 crores ($89 million).  In addition, the 
report’s quantified health effects due to asthma and cancer incidence rates were found to be 
significant and not included in these financial loss figures. The report concludes that 
externalities have not been addressed in either the short or long-run, and that regulating 
agencies at the State and Central level have failed to protect the environment and people of 
the region. Clearly, a very large surplus exists for welfare investments and compensation that 
is denied given the current bundle of property rights in iron-ore and its manner of allocation 
by regulators. In the light of the framework this indicates there is excessive reliance on global 
iron-ore markets and none on local non-mining stakeholder relationships. Our framework 
reveals an institutional loophole, due to missing relationships between the local community 
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and the mining corporations, as well as regulators. Mining firms and global ore processors 
dyads are connected through markets that do not price externalities of mining. The report, 
now submitted to the Supreme Court of India, recommends empowering a committee 
consisting of representatives of local self-governments to decide on how stakeholder 
involvement should be organized and governed.  
 
BIOFUEL SECTOR GROWTH IN USA 
The biofuel (non-fossil fuels, mainly ethanol and biodiesel) product market is an 
immature sector but is growing rapidly. One estimate has its size growing to US $139.6 
billion globally by 2016, a growth rate of 16% (Lucintel 2012). Efforts to produce and market 
biofuels depend on national energy policies that have sent mixed signals to producers and 
marketers in recent years. Risks abound on the supply side such as adequacy of feedstock and 
obsolescence of processes, as well as on the demand side such as mandates and policies on 
renewables. The limited numbers of biofuel producers are represented by associations, such as 
the National Biodiesel Board (NBB) in the US, that attempt to influence policy. Global 
biofuel chains and networks have participants of widely varying capabilities and subject to 
very different regulatory environments. Therefore, stakeholders in biofuel markets are forced 
to routinely grapple with information problems in uncertain, imperfectly perceived conditions. 
Markets for energy crops as feedstock for biofuels unlike field crops are particularly risky as 
their futures are not traded. Confidence level in markets can ride upon how well the market 
deals with risks. The market’s performance therefore determines participation decisions, 
expansion of markets, and prices that commodity biofuels will fetch. 
Moreover, the emission savings from use of biofuels do not get monetized in permit 
markets. An FSA report (2008) lists several market risk classes, including those of market 
foundation, integrity and liquidity for emission credits. FSA cautions participants to perform 
their own due diligence on emission credit market risks. Kumarappan & Joshi (2009) point 
out that savings in emissions in substituting fossil fuels with biofuels is based on lifecycle 
assessments but proposed emission credits trading rights, a form of property rights to multi-
stakeholder effort, would be vested with only one stakeholder who trades the credit – the 
manufacturer. This will cause incentive problems. The framework’s network contract 
instruments like syndication are necessary for incentives to share private information and 
assign property rights in biofuel emission credits trading. The problems in biofuel product and 
emission credit markets illustrate the importance of the framework’s market instruments. 
Growth is risky and restricted when market instruments are weak or unable to compensate for 
contractual and relationship limitations. 
Appendix 2 summarizes the framework analysis of these three examples.  
 
CONCLUSION & FUTURE RESEARCH 
Several organizations must jointly participate in strategies for sustainable development 
and share in responsibilities as damaging externalities are caused by complex collective 
interests. A property rights approach to sustainability strategies is rooted in responsibilities for 
managed use of resources and exchange behaviours. The paper used three research streams to 
propose a discriminating framework: network organizational models, exchange governance 
modes, and instrumental stakeholder theory. The framework has two dimensions: (i) a ‘trans-
organizational model’ dimension with either Dyads (bilateral stakeholder organizations) or 
Networks (multi-lateral stakeholder organizations); and (ii) a ‘mode of governance’ 
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dimension, whether Contract, Market or Relationship. The framework is useful in that it 
describes differences and therefore recognizes what constitutes plurality in instruments and 
associated instrumental behaviors. Application of the framework to diverse examples of 
marine products in New Zealand, mining in India, and biofuel in USA illustrate its potential 
for analysis.  
The rich research streams used to develop the framework hold promise for future 
development of the framework. Descriptive approaches to instrumental stakeholder theory can 
drive empirical generalizations and further grounded research. Margolis & Walsh (2003) 
discuss related normative and descriptive research agendas, but omit to raise the issue of 
economic externalities. Recent work by Kashyap et al (2012) in plural governance modes 
offers guidelines for similar research in sustainability contexts. Aftab et al (2010) evaluate a 
“mixed approach” of economic instruments and management standards when two 
environmental objectives need to be met simultaneously and show that mixed instruments 
outperform stand-alone economic incentives or managerial controls under certain conditions. 
Future empirical research is called for that qualifies generalizations about instruments by 
specifying conditions of success. A similar descriptive research approach for trans-
organizational models – whether dyadic or network – is another research direction.  
The inclusion of causal effects of externality as mediating corporate social and 
financial performances is a promising direction for conceptual and empirical research. There 
is a dearth of integrative case studies, and the framework could help define dimensions and 
designs for sustainability case study research. Further evidence is needed, but a preliminary 
conclusion is that the plural instrumental approach to management of property rights and 
responsibilities is likely to lead to superior sustainability outcomes.  
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APPENDIX 1: INSTRUMENTS AS SETS OF BEHAVIORS 
 
Type of 
Instrument 
Description of instrumental behaviours in the organizational model- 
governance mode framework. 
DYADS CONTRACTS 
Property 
Rights 
Public administration assigns rights, using either allocation or auctions, to secure, 
exclusive and transferable titles to resources so that the owner will not engage in 
resource extraction unless the price of the resource commodity covers not only the 
extraction cost but also the foregone future benefit as a result of present use. Rights 
are restricted through liens, easements, and other caveats on use and disposal. 
Liability 
Laws 
The organization is responsible to a public authority under Public Law. For 
instance, Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) laws, such as take backs, 
require the producer to assume responsibility for post-consumer disposal of waste.  
Taxes, 
penalty 
fees, 
licenses, 
subsidies 
Pollution has financial burdens as a social policy directly where possible. Output 
from dirty technologies is taxed at a higher rate than clean technologies which may 
even receive a subsidy. This modifies consumption of technological processes to 
favour clean technologies and reduces pollution.  
Linear 
Incentives  
A target level of pollution is established and under-runs or over-runs are 
rewarded or penalized in accordance with a linear sharing formula agreed upon 
between the supplier and the buyer in the contract.  
Yardstick 
incentives: 
Contests and tournaments between suppliers for business rewards are useful 
when common uncertainties and moral hazard are involved. Pollution 
abatement can become an effective learning race between agents.  
Quotas/Allo
wances 
 
Resources are rationed based on the ability of natural processes to regenerate. 
Forestry and fisheries have long been subject to such quota limitations. Energy 
supplied over the grid has positive quotas for renewable sources that must be 
exceeded. Caps restrict the quantity of emissions allowed. 
DYADS MARKETS 
Brokerage Intermediation by professional services to match two parties to an exchange 
agreement, in order to improve upon search costs and provide superior access 
and more efficient conclusion of agreements. 
Bidding/ 
Reverse 
Auctions  
Agents bid for public agency or bid-taker contracts for sustainability services. 
Hidden information on agent competencies and types are revealed by the 
reverse auctions special price discovery mechanisms.  
DYADS COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIPS 
Equity 
Investments  
Dyads may internally finance investments in clean technology with loans and 
equity shares between buyer and seller. Financial benefits can accrue to the 
dyad by lowering the cost of working capital and ensuring investments go to 
mutually beneficial clean technologies. 
Cooperative 
Bargaining & 
Negotiation 
Process of offers and counteroffers, with possible expansion of issues on the table, 
leading to agreements that enhance joint payoffs among negotiating partners while 
improving each partners best alternatives to agreement. 
NETWORK CONTRACTS 
Syndicates 
 
Team production leading to joint payoffs, revenues and incomes, which are shared 
among members of the team in accordance with pre-determined rules.  
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Franchising Distribution systems designed by a franchisor as a principal, and where services 
are rendered for consumers at the point of consumption by franchisees as agents.   
NETWORK MARKETS 
Brand 
Clubs 
Brands for green clubs and enhance branding through demanding criteria for 
membership, communicate to their audiences and extend the reach of networking.   
Permit 
Exchanges  
Market Exchanges create settings for exchange of tradable discharge permits 
(TDPs) and promulgate standards that sellers must meet for TDPs. Market making 
and execution of trades is possible when large numbers of buyer and sellers 
register on such exchanges.  
Labels/Foot
prints 
Information is provided to the customer at the point of purchase that influences 
purchase and use behaviour. The usual labels for sustainability are carbon 
footprints, and a variety of Green Marks. 
NETWORK COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIPS 
Board 
Reviews 
Accreditation boards conduct reviews on specific processes required to qualify 
and maintain membership, which are held periodically by boards constituted 
from representatives of member organizations.   
Standards & 
Certificatio
n 
Global consortiums such as Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) influence 
reporting by member firms and use such initiatives to set standards.  
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APPENDIX 2: EXAMPLES OF GOVERNANCE INSTRUMENTS 
(missing instruments are in caps)  
 
  FRAMEWORK CELL 
  A 
Network-
Contract 
B 
Network-
Market 
C 
Network-
Relationship 
D 
Dyad-Contract 
E 
Dyad-
Market 
F 
Dyad-
Relationship 
EXAMPLE 
Marine 
Product 
Co-
Manage
ment in 
New 
Zealand 
Syndicates- such as 
groups of Rock 
Lobster fishing 
companies 
 
Permit Exchanges 
– of ITQs through 
auctions 
MISSING 
STANDARDS FOR 
TRADITIONAL 
NON-QUOTA 
RELATED WORK 
PROCESSES 
Quotas/Allowances- for 
catch of specific species. 
 
Property Rights – of 
bundle of rights and 
responsibilities with 
Individual transferable 
quotas (ITQs) 
Brokerage, 
reverse 
auctions of 
unbundled 
ITQs 
 
MISSING EQUITY 
ARRANGEMENTS 
OR 
NEGOTIATED 
RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR 
UNBUNDLING 
OF EXTRACTION 
RIGHTS 
Mining for 
Iron-Ore 
in India 
MISSING 
GROUPS OF 
STAKEHOLDERS 
IN NETWORK 
Export markets 
 
MISSING 
MINERAL & 
DISCHARGE 
PERMIT 
EXCHANGES 
MISSING 
STANDARDS FOR  
EIA AND 
POLLUTION 
CONTROL 
BOARD REVIEWS 
Property Rights on 
surface minerals 
 
MISSING 
COMMUNITY 
STAKEHOLDERS IN 
MINERAL & 
DISCHARGE 
PERMITS RIGHTS 
ALLOCATIONS 
Brokerage, 
auctions of 
mineral 
extraction rights 
MISSING EQUITY 
OR 
NEGOTIATED 
COMPENSATION 
FOR INCOME, 
CARBON OR 
HEALTH LOSSES 
Biofuel 
Sector 
Growth in 
USA 
MISSING 
RESOURCE 
POOLING AND 
RISK SHARING 
SYNDICATES 
Global market for 
commodity biofuel 
products 
 
MISSING 
PERMIT & 
FUTURES 
EXCHANGES 
MISSING 
STANDARDS FOR 
LAND USE 
ELEMENTS OF 
LIFE CYCLE 
ASSESSMENTS 
Supply chain contracts 
for feedstock, 
manufacture, blending, 
and sales 
 
MISSING 
CERTIFICATES OF 
EMISSION 
REDUCTION 
RIGHTS 
Brokerage, and 
reverse auctions 
for commodity 
fuel blends 
MISSING EQUITY 
OR 
NEGOTIATED 
COMPENSATION 
FOR LIFE CYCLE 
EMISSION 
REDUCTIONS 
 
 
